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COMMENTAIRES 
RESPONSIVE BARGAINING : FREEDOM TO STRIKE 
WITH RESPONSIBILITY 
S.M.A. HAMEED 
Strikes and lockouts are an essential and intégral part of the collective 
bargaining process in North America. A sudden onrush of strikes in the 
past few years has, however, exasperated the public. Now there are 
numerous demands that the System be replaced by some form of com-
pulsory arbitration. It is argued in this paper that though strikes hâve 
become less effective, lengthy, and costly, largely due to automation, 
compulsory arbitration will prove even costlier in more than monetary 
terms. Therefore, what is needed is to reinforce the rôle and fonction 
of strike in a way that our System of free collective bargaining is preserved 
with as little inconvenience to the public as possible. A System of respon-
sive bargaining may be an answer to this problem in allowing the two 
parties, labour and management, a complète freedom to strike while, at 
the same time, remaining ultimately responsable or accountable to the 
public from an économie point of view. 
DECLINING UTILITY OF STRIKES 
With technological development the overhead costs of the manage-
ment increase, thus giving the unions greater strike power. However, it is 
not long before automation reaches a point that unions become ineffec-
tive in stopping production altogether and consequently losing their newly 
acquired power to inflict heavy losses on the management *. This begins 
the era of dreary, long drawn out strikes where neither party being 
seriously injured, both parties procrastinate indefinitely. So much for 
* Hameed, S.M.A., Professor, Faculty of Business Administration and Com-
merce, University of Alberta. The author is indebted to Dr. Syeda Hameed for her 
valuable help in editing this paper. 
i See Thomas KENNEDY, «Freedom to Strike is in the Public Interest, » 
Harvard Business Review, July-August, 1970. 
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private sector. In addition, there is the tertiary or service sector in which 
a large number of industries are government operated. Hère another 
phenomenon works for prolongation of strikes. Not being subjected to 
profit losses in the sensé the private sector is, the service sector strike 
often tends to stretch out indefinitely. The increasing length of strikes 
in Canada is empirically borne out as the average duration of strikes has 
increased since the war 2. 
The worker is no longer the picture of misery he presented during 
a strike in the early stages of collective bargaining. He is now partially 
compensated by strike pay, unemployment Insurance and may even hâve 
enough savings to tide him through the hardship days. Despite thèse 
advantages, however, there are the highly automated industries such as 
the utilities, oil and chemicals which inevitably blunt the strike weapon 
of the workers, so much so that they may be obliged to submit their 
disputes for arbitration3. The growing public dissatisfaction with the 
disruption of essential services in hospital and school strikes in Québec, 
a six week garbage strike in Vancouver, a nation-wide three week postal 
strike, a dock strike in Montréal, construction strike in Vancouver, has 
led to widespread demand for curtailing or altogether depriving the work-
ers' right to strike. This reaction, while it may be justified on grounds of 
public and private « cost » of strikes, has a distinct disadvantage in the 
fact of a possible loss of the démocratie principle in trying to impose 
arbitrary settlements. It inevitably leads to control of salaries, priées, and 
profits. The principle of voluntary seulement, thus destroyed, may in 
turn lead to « the end of our busisess System. » 4 Another disadvantage 
of instituting compulsory arbitration is the increased possibility of illégal 
work stoppages. In Australia where arbitration is compulsory, for example, 
there hâve been in some years as many as fifteen times the number of 
strikes in Canada5. Thus it may be argued that the threat of a strike 
reduces the possibility of its actual occurence. Many settlements are 
reached in view of a strike ultimatum. In a behavioral context, the first 
few days of a strike prove cathartic for the frustrated workers, which 
purge them of their pent up resentments. The air thus cleared, they can 
approach the bargaining table for a more meaningful and acceptable 
seulement. 
2 Although we are arguing hère that automation and declining utility of the 
strikes are responsible for the longer average duration of strikes, Professor Stuart 
Jamieson attributes it to the two-stage System in Canada. See Stuart JAMIESON, 
« The Third Wave Labour Unrest and Industrial Conflict in Canada : 1900-1967, > 
Industrial Relations Quarterly Review, Vol. 25, No. 1, 1970. 
3 Thomas KENNEDY, op. cit. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Canadian Industrial Relations, Privy Council Office, 1968, p. 125. 
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NO LEGAL PROCEDURE FOR SHORTENING 
THE LENGTH OF AN « ORDINARY » STRIKE 
In the North American context, strike is legally recognized, but, 
paradoxically the law seems to suggest that it is better not to hâve any 
strikes. The bias and emphasis hère is to minimize the occurrences of 
industrial disputes. To achieve this end the instituted légal procédure in 
Canada is to delay the occurence of a strike through a two-stage com-
pulsory conciliation System and a supervised vote on the Conciliation 
Board award with appropriate time intervais between various stages of 
thèse proceedings. Once the strike becomes légal, both in theory and 
practice, it could continue indefinitely. Public interest disputes constitute 
a notable exception to this prolongation, since they are handled under 
emergency powers of the government. In essence, then, for ail the ordin-
ary disputes, the légal procédure virtually ends with the beginning of a 
légal strike. Labour and management may break off negotiations during 
a strike and may not see one another for days, without being subjected to 
légal constraints and without even inflicting serious losses upon one 
another. A strike, thus continuing, may achieve no meaningful direction 
towards a speedy seulement. But there is no defined procédure in labour 
relations law which may shorten the length of a strike. That government 
interférence in a légal strike is répugnant to the tenants of free collective 
bargaining is the rationale for this légal stands. This stand, though legit-
imate and defensible some three or four décades ago when automation 
had not reduced the effectiveness and utility of strikes needs to be re-
examined today since the public is subjected to long and purposeless 
strikes. The law which safeguards the workers' right to strike does not, 
at the same time, protect the freedom of the public to obtain goods and 
services while the strike is on. Conceptually and philosophically this is an 
untenable position. If the law must guarantee complète freedom for 
strike and lockout it must, at the same time, guarantee corresponding com-
pensation to the public for having suffered inconvenience and hardship 
during the strike. Sermonizing the public on forbearance with magnanimity 
during a strike because « strikes are good for our System » is of little 
value unless accompanied with adéquate compensation. If the proffered 
compensation can also make the strikes short and effective we hâve 
achieved a dual purpose. This would be in public interest and, at the 
same time, vindicate the law from responsibility for causing public in-
convenience. 
MAKE THE BARGAINING RESFONSIVE 
The system of collective bargaining as practised hère, in North 
America, has served the labour, management and public faithfully since 
the passage of the American Wagner Act and the Canadian Order-in-
Council 1003. With the exception of certain modifications made immedi-
ately after the Second World War, the system has remained basically un-
changed. By and large, the concepts and practices in the industrial relations 
system hâve remained confined to the interaction among labour, manage-
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ment and government. The industrial relations system has not developed 
as an intégral part of the society. For a long time, labour-management 
relations were considered a strictly bi-lateral affair which could brook 
no interférence from anyone, not even the government. After World 
War II, however, government intrusion led to its graduai récognition as 
part of the system. Now the stage seems set for the inclusion of a fourth 
actor, namely the public or society at large, to complète the bargaining 
circle. 
The labour-management disputes in the form of strikes and lockouts 
sometimes affect the public more than they affect the respective parties. 
This naturally leads to public involvement in labour-management disputes. 
Labour and management being a small part of the social system, it follows 
logically, must remain ultimately responsible and accountable to the very 
society in which they function. The concept of collective bargaining which 
visualized labour and management in isolation must change because 
the freedom to strike can only survive if it becomes responsive to the 
public. The question arises, then, what should be the mechanics of a 
system of responsive collective bargaining ? 
THE MECHANICS 
So far this paper has put forth three arguments 6. First, because of 
automation, the utility and effectiveness of strikes has declined. This has 
led to purposeless and lengthy strikes which prove exasperating for the 
public. Secondly, there is no provision in labour relations law which can 
reduce the length of an « ordinary » strike. Thirdly, it is important that 
the strike and lockout action of the labour and management must be 
accountable to the public. This accouhtability must be in the form of 
économie or financial compensation. The mechanics of the system of 
responsive bargaining as outlined in the following section, attempts to 
capture the spirit of the above arguments, 
MID-STRIKE CONCILIATION BOARD (MSCB) 
In Canada, the dispute seulement procédure under fédéral and 
provincial laws exists only in cases where public interest is threatened. 
If it is determined that a certain dispute is indeed a public interest 
dispute it could be subjected to one of several procédures, namely, a 
higher level conciliation or médiation, some form of arbitration, inquiry 
commission, or spécial législation. An « ordinary » dispute, however, 
does not call for any seulement procédure, unless by its définitive 
flexibility it could be regarded as a public interest dispute. When an 
6 The ideas contained in this section are inspired by earlier writings on this 
subject, notably Gérard DION, « The statutory Strike Formula, » Relations Indus-
trielles, April, 1969. 
214 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES, VOL. 29 , NO 1 
« ordinary » dispute becomes a public interest dispute, is not known7. 
The length of the strike may be one determining factor, but ultimately 
it remains a political décision. Hère one may put forth the main con-
tention of this paper that the lack of instituting a defined and compré-
hensible procédure and leaving the matter to a political décision make 
the industrial relations practices vulnérable and open to abuses. 
Under a System of responsive bargaining there would be a con-
tinuation of well understood procédures from the very inception of a 
strike up until the final seulement. The pre-strike conciliation will be 
linked up with the procédure to be followed during the strike. Especially, 
then, there is need for a législative procédure for labour and management 
to meet under a newly constituted Mid-strike Conciliation Board, three 
days after the strike has begun. Thèse three days must provide the essential 
ventilation or cathartic period for the workers. Furthermore, a three-day-
period is short enough not to cause the public serious inconvenience. It 
could be made longer or shorter, depending on actual expérience. 
It is préférable not to hâve the Conciliation Board members serve 
on the MSCB 8. It may save time, however, to appoint the MSCB at the 
same time as the Conciliation Board is appointed. If a settiement is 
reached before or during the first three days of a strike the MSCB is 
automatically dissolved, if not it will start functioning on day four of the 
strike 9. Its two basic fonctions are, first to bring the parties back to the 
bargaining table and second, what is more important, to work out at 
the start of each negotiating day (from and including day four of the 
strike) an amount of compensation for the public to be paid equally by 
7
 The Task Force on Labour Relations made the following observations which 
indicate the dilemma and vagueness in instituting a comprehensive procédure : 
« First, it is extremely difficult to say with certainty or conviction in advance of 
actual events in what industry or service and at what time resort to économie 
sanctions ought to be curtailed. Second, the length of a strike or lochout frequently 
is a critical factor in making such an assessment. Third, there can be no one policy 
or procédure that works with uniform success. Fourth, flexibility of approach is 
essential lest the parties build the existing policy of procédure into their stratégies. 
Fifth, a détermination that a given stoppage of work ought to be terminated is 
essentially a political décision. Sixth, the political élément in a potential emergency 
dispute is an inducement to the parties to drive the dispute beyond any procédural 
device for settiement and into the political arena. Seventh, circumstances may be 
expected to arise in the eventual course of industrial conflict in which disobedience 
to and défiance of the law will not be forestalled by that law. > Task Force on 
Labour Relations, Ibid., p. 170. 
8
 The members of the MSCB will hâve a différent mandate, therefore it is 
advisable to constitute a new body. 
9
 The MSCB will continue to function till a final settiement is reached, After 
the settiement, it will submit a report to the Industrial Relations Board of the 
province or to the Canadian Labour Relations Board at the fédéral level. It will 
also submit a financial report to the Department of Internai Revenue. 
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labour and management and deposited in a Strike Compensation Account 
(SCA). 
THE SCALE OF COMPENSATION 
The Conciliation Board award of the wage rate 10 should be treated 
as a bench-mark to calculate the differentials for the respective labour 
and management positions, as they stand, when MSCB brings them back to 
the bargaining table. The amount of compensation should be assessed on 
the differentials on a rising scale, i.e. one per cent per employée for day 
four of the strike, two per cent on day five, and so on. The amount of 
compensation should be calculated for each day and the chairman of 
the MSCB should be responsible for informing both parties at the start 
of the negotiations. Since the amount of compensation is calculated on the 
differential between the Conciliation Board award and the respective 
positions of the parties, there will be an incentive for each party to narrow 
the differentials : management would benefit by increasing their offer 
and labour by lowering their demand. This arrangement would exert an 
extraneous pressure on the parties to bargain in « good faith. » 
When presented with the calculated compensation, each party would 
realize what the payment of this compensation means in seulement terms, 
i.e. their positions may be automatically altered. For example, each suc-
cessive day of the strike brings on increasing compensation payment : for 
the management it involves financial burden without having raised the 
offer from A to B (see the chart below) and for the labour it means re-
duced gains even if the settlement was made at C. Therefore, by not 
altering their original positions, management incurred an expense of AB 
and labour forfeited the concession equal to CD. 
C Labour's last demand. 
D No change in labour's demand but the 
amount of compensation has reduced 
labour's likely gains, if the settlement 
was made at C. 
F Management's new offer. 
E Conciliation Board award. 
B No change in Management's offer but 
the amount of compensation has raised 
management's financial burden. 
A Management's last offer. 
In order to avoid compensation payments, however, one or both 
parties may alter their positions to corne closer to Conciliation Board 
award, E. It is conceivable that after X number of strike days, the man-
agement may make a wage offer higher than E (i.e. F in the chart given 
!0 it will be difficult to convert the Conciliation Board award on non-wage 
issues into dollar terms. Although items of fringe benefits, hours of work and even 
job security demands hâve a price tag. 
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above) in which case it would not pay any compensation and moreover 
receive an amount proportionate to the différence between E and F., from 
the compensation paid by the labour, or from its own compensation pay-
ment made from day four of the strike onwards to the day the « new 
offer » is made. 
Depending on the number of employées involved in a strike and 
the nature of differential between the Conciliation Board award and the 
respective positions of the parties, the compensation payment; could 
increase in such proportions that after a strike period of between ten to 
fifteen day s, both labour and management could begin to erode their 
original positions if they do not settle. So long as they are willing to take 
cuts in favour of the public they would be free to continue their strike 
and lockout. 
DISPOSAL OF THE COMPENSATION PAYMENT 
A Strike Compensation Account (SCA) should be maintained by 
the fédéral and provincial governments in which should be deposited ail 
compensation payments coUected in their respective jurîsdictions for a 
given fiscal year n . Thèse funds should be distributed among the tax 
payers, on a per-capita basis as a compensation for the inconvenience 
caused to them by various strikes during that year. Every tax payer (in-
cluding the two parties, labour and management) should receive this 
payment, perhaps in the form of tax free income, or possibly a tax dé-
duction. That the two parties should be included among the récipients 
of the compensation payment is due to the fact that they are equally in-
convenienced by the unavailability of goods and services as is the bystand-
ing public. 
ADVANTAGES OF RESPONSIVE BARGAINING 
The System of responsive bargaining as outlined in the preceding 
pages has the following advantages. 
1. It préserves the workers' right to strike which, by itself, is an 
important emotional outlet for them in allowing them to freely 
ventilate their frustrations. In récognition of this fact, the first 
three days of the strike impose no compensation payment on 
the disputing parties. 
2. It places an increasing burden on the parties to settle their 
dispute speedly, thus making the strike weapon useful and 
effective. 
3. The length of the strike is shortened without any direct govern-
ment intervention. 
11
 Recovering compensation payment from the management, in accordance 
with the financial statement of the MSCB, should be no problem for the government. 
It could pose a problem, as far as the employées are concerned. However, it could 
be debited to the employées pension fund. 
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4. The possibility of an indefinite strike is still kept open provided 
both parties are willing to pay for it. 
5. The public receives financial compensation for being incon-
venienced throughout the period of strike, exception the first 
three days. 
6. Since the length of the strike is considerably shortened, it be-
comes possible to permit strikes even in the public sector, re-
quiring no procédure for settling emergency disputes. 
7. It disperses the spectre of a costly System of compulsory arbi-
tration. 
IMPLEMENTING THE SYSTEM OF RESPONSIVE BARGAINING 
Contemporary collective bargaining may be regarded as « an in-
strument for the pursuit of social and économie justice. » 12 It is equally 
a mechanism for the allocation of resources in the labour market, but 
negatively, it is a System which causes hardship to the public through 
industrial disputes. For its first two qualities it is laudable and must be 
preserved ; for its last quality (or disqualification) it can erode the very 
basis of its existence. In Québec and British Columbia, for instance, the 
labour unrest is of such magnitude that it may well become an élection 
issue. The public is prone to react negatively to the workers' right to 
strike. This would be unfortunate and régressive to the development of 
meaningful labour, management and public relations. Public interest in 
labour-management relations has consideraly increased due to the mass 
média. Now it is becoming aware of and sympathetic to the hardship 
caused to other segments of society through work stoppages. With such 
tremendous conœnsus against industrial disputes, it is imperative that 
the system shows signs of responsiveness to the public. Through a System 
of responsive bargaining, then, the divergent interests of labour management 
and the public will be finally reconciled. 
Will the proposed system of responsive bargaining work ? Will the 
parties agrée to subscribe to the Strike Compensation Account? The 
system will work because it has benefits for the larger segment of the 
society. Some unions or companies may object to the system of payment. 
But for that matter many tax payers dislike, resist and even évade the 
system. Nevertheless, governmnts collect taxes and a vast majority of in-
dividuals and corporations subscribe to the system willingly because they 
witness the social and économie benefits of their contributions. Similarly, 
strike compensation payment can acquire acceptability if the résultant 
social benefits are experienced by the society at large. Needless to say 
that it could hâve broad électoral support as well. On the other hand, 
labour and management reluctant to make such payments can reach 
speedy settlements. 
12 Canadian Industrial Relations, op. cit., p. 169. 
